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City of Las Vegas v. Evans, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 31 (May 02, 2013)1
EMPLOYMENT LAW – Workers’ Compensation
Summary
The court considered whether a firefighter who does not qualify for a presumption that
his cancer is a compensable occupational disease may still seek to prove it is a compensable
occupational disease without the benefit of the presumption. The court also considered whether
the appeals officer erred in awarding benefits in this case for a firefighter’s cancer.
Disposition/Outcome
The court found that failing to qualify for a presumption that an illness is an occupational
disease for workers’ compensation purposes does not preclude a finding that the disease is an
occupational disease eligible for compensation through medical testimony. The court also found
that the appeals officer had not abused her discretion.
Factual and Procedural History
Evans was a fire fighter with the City of Las Vegas for four years before being diagnosed
with cancer. He responded to numerous fires and was exposed to carcinogens. He filed for
workers’ compensation benefits for his cancer but was initially denied. He appealed to the
Department of Administration Hearings Division, where a hearings officer also denied his claim.
The hearings officer asserted that the normal standard of determining compensable occupational
disease2 did not apply since there was a standard to presume that a firefighter’s cancer is
presumed to be a compensable occupational disease.3 The hearings officer further asserted that
the presumption did not apply to Evans since it required five years or more as a firefighter to
come into effect4 and he had only been a firefighter for four years.
The appeals officer affirmed that the presumption did not apply.

But, after taking

extensive medical testimony, found that the normal standard could apply and that Evans had met
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the burden of proof. The city then appealed to the district court which declined to review the
decision.

The city thus appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court arguing that only the

presumption could apply and that the appeals officer had erred in saying that his burden had been
met.
Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court, focusing on the plain meaning of the statute, declared that
failure to qualify for a presumption that cancer was an occupational disease under NRS 617.443
does not prevent a city employee from seeking compensation under the normal standard in NRS
617.440 and NRS 617.358. Rather, qualifying under NRS 617.443 would create a rebuttable
presumption in the employee’s favor and failure to qualify for that presumption would merely
require the employee to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disease resulted
from the course of their employment.
The court also considered whether the appeals officer abused her discretion in finding
that the disease arose from Evan’s employment. The court noted that it reviews only for abuse of
discretion and does not substitute its own judgment for the original trier of fact. It found that
substantial medical testimony was adequately reviewed and that the appeals officer did not abuse
her discretion.
Conclusion
The court ruled that NRS 617.453 provides a rebuttable presumption that cancer is an
occupational disease for those that meet its qualifications, but failure to meet its qualifications
does not preclude a city employee with cancer from seeking workers’ compensation by proving
through a preponderance of the evidence that it is an occupational disease. Further, the appeals
officer’s ruling that Evan’s cancer was a compensable occupational disease was supported by
substantial evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.

